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Abstract 
This paper offers a model of three-party elections which allows voters to combine 
retrospective economic evaluations with considerations of the positions of the parties in 
the issue-space as well as the issue-preferences of the voters. We describe a model of 
British elections which allows voters to consider simultaneously all three parties, rather 
than limiting voters to choices among pairs of parties as is usually done. Using this model 
we show that both p olicy issues and the state of the national economy matter in British 
elections. We also show how voters framed their decisions. Voters first made a retro­
spective evaluation of the Conservative party based on economic p erformance; and those 
voters that rejected the Conservative party chose between Labour and Alliance based 
on issue positions. Through simulations of the effects of issues - we move the parties 
in the issue space and re-es t imate \'Ote-shares - and the economy - we hypothesize an 
alternative distribution of views of t he economy for voters - we show that Labour has 
virtually no chance to 1.vin \Yith the All i an ce as a viable alternative. Even if the Alliance 
(or the Liberal Democrats) disappears. Labour will need to significantly moderate its 
policy positions to have a chance of competing with the Conservative party. We argue 
that the methodological technique we em ploy. multinomial probit, is a superior mech­
anism for studying three-;-party elec t i ons a._<; i t  allows for a richer formulation of politics 
than do competing methods. 
Issues, Economics and the Dynamics of Multi-Party 
Elections: The British 1987 General Election 
R. Michael Alvarez* Shaun Bowler Jonathan Nagler 
1 Introduction 
There are at least two theories of voter-choice in multi-party elections. The first empha­
sizes retrospective voting: voters evaluate the incumbent party based on economic per­
formance. The second theory emphasizes prospective voting based on issue-evaluations 
of each of the parties. The theories should be viewed as complimentary rather than 
alternative theories, because each theory by itself is inadequate to explain voter deci­
sions in a multi-party setting. The retrospective voting model cannot explain how voters 
choose between competing out-parties if they decide to vote against the in-party. And 
the issue voting model does not allow voters to punish or reward the incumbent party for 
economic performance. In this paper we offer a model that allows for the integration and 
simultaneous testing of both of these theories. To test both theories we need to measure 
voters' views of the economy and voters' views of the parties' positions on the issues, and 
incorporate them into a single model. 
Here we examine voter choice in the 1987 British general election with a model 
which allows us to examine the impact of both retrospective and prospective issues si­
multaneously for the three major parties. Previous research has shown that voters punish 
the incumbent party for poor ecouomic performance (Alt 1979 , Crewe 1 992). We first
determine how retrospective voting operates in a three-party race. We show that past 
economic performance infi uenced the Ii kclihood of whether an individual would vote for 
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the incumbent party (the Conservatives). And we also show that these same retrospec­
tive economic evaluations played little role in voter evaluations of the non-incumbent 
parties. 
Previous work has examined the importance of issues in Britain (Alt 1979, 1984; 
Crewe 1992). Our model also lets us look at prospective issue voting in multi-party 
elections in a new way: we examine both how parties could influence their vote-share 
by moving in the issue space with the existing configuration of parties, and how the 
Conservative and Labour parties could influence their vote-share if the issue space were 
not crowded by the presence of the Social Democratic-Liberal Alliance. This gives us 
the opportunity to measure both the impact of prospective issue voting in a multi-party 
election and the electoral significance of a third party. Below we show that under the 
existing configuration of parties, none could substantially improve their vote-shares by 
moving in the issue space. But we show that if the Alliance were to d rop out of British 
electoral politics, Labour could substantially increase their vote-share by moderating 
their issue positions. In general this analysis demonstrates that prospective issue voting 
is an important component of multi-party elections, since we present strong evidence 
which supports the hypothesis that individuals are much more likely to vote for parties 
closer to their own positions on a variety of issues. 
In research on the British case, however, attention typically focuses only on vote 
shifts or judgments relating to the two main parties - Conservative and Labour. In 
such studies, researchers simply ignore the presence of the Liberal or Alliance parties, 
and usually remove those who vote for these parties from their analyses (e.g. McAllister 
and Studlar 1 992) . Such a focus necessarily downplays the role of minor parties such 
as the Liberal Democrats (to use their current name) or the Alliance (to use a previous 
label), and bleaches debates of an" effects introduced by the presence of a third party. 
For example, the debate between Crewe ( 1992) and Heath et al. ( 1 99 1 )  over the rela­
tive importance of issues ·within the 1981 election is largely carried on in terms of the 
judgments voters made comparing the Labour and Conservative parties on the relevant 
issues. Another tactic that has been employed in the study of British elections has been 
-to assume that the· Liberal or Alliance parties are positioned midway between the Con­
servative and Labour parties. v;hich i:-; not true on all the issues, and proceed to assign 
vote-shares to the parties (\1cAllist e r  and .\lughan 1987; .tvlishler et al. 1989 ) .  
A large part of this dichotomou'.' "Conservative vs others" approach toward British 
elections has been driven by the arnilabilit�· of relevant estimation procedures: binomial 
pro bit and logit are readily arnilable toob for analyzing two-party races. But a large part, 
too, reflects a willingness to make a strong assumption about the underlying conception of 
the party competition. Previous literature typically assumes, rather than demonstrates, 
that the choice made by British voters is primarily one between Labour and Conservative, 
rather than a three-way choice that also includes the Liberal Democrats. Yet the nature 
of this party competition is a question with an empirical answer. As such, we would be 
well served by adopting techniques of analysis which allow us to discern the way voters 
view their choices. 
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Comparisons between the two 'major parties' provide only limited insight into the 
choices made by voters who are faced with the task of simultaneously considering three 
parties. Some of the authors discussed so far recognize that this may be a problem. 
For example Heath et al. note: "one important reason why Labour does rather poorly 
according to this model is that the Alliance position was closer to Labour's than it was 
to the Conservatives' position, thus leaving the Conservatives with a larger territory over 
which to gather votes (Heath et al. 1991: 218)." By this they mean that Alliance and 
Labour split the left vote, suggesting that, despite their general thesis that issue effects 
did not determine the 1987 election outcome, issues may have an important role to play 
in the election in helping voters decide which opposition party to vote for. This, in turn, 
makes it clear that it is important to model vote choice over the. three alternatives in one 
unified model. It is a fallacy to pretend that the third party does not affect the fortunes 
of. the other two parties. A model which considers the choice over all three parties 
simultaneously, rather than separately, would allow us to determine the importance of 
issue effects in British elections, as well as to examine the impact of economic evaluations 
and more generally, retrospective voting, in the three-party setting. It would also allow 
us to determine the impact of the existing third party, as well as to estimate the impact 
of the withdrawal of the third party.1 By ignoring the three choices voters face, other 
work underestimates the effects of issues. 
We estimate a well-specified model of voter-choice in the 1987 election that contains 
at least four features which we feel make it superior to past efforts. First, we separate 
the three choices and allow the voter to consider simultaneously all three parties. Sec­
ond, we do not make unduly restrictive assumptions about the impact of a third party 
on the relative probabilities of choosing either of the other parties. Third, we include 
explicit measures for the distance between respondents and parties on seven different 
issues . With these measures we estimate the impact of each issue on the vote-choice 
of individuals for all three parties and estimate the impact of movement by the parties 
on these issue-positions. Fourth. we include measures of voter evaluations of past eco­
nomic performance on inflation, unemployment, and taxation . These variables allow us 
to examine retrospective economic voting for all three parties. 
Use of such a modei allows us tu test directly the competing hypotheses we feel are 
still unanswered about British general elections. First, we examine the importance of the 
positions taken by the Labour party on key issues such as defense and nationalization. We 
find that these positions account for Lal>our's lack of success in the 1987 election .  Second, 
we measure the impact of a major short-term force: voters' perceptions of the economy. 
We predict how different the election would have been had voters' perceptions of the 
economy been as they were in 1992. and we find both Labour and the Alliance would 
have received greater shares of the vote. Third, we ascertain how voters saw the parties 
as similar or dissimilar to each other. \\'c find that voters perceived Labour and the 
Conservatives as dissimilar. but that the Alliance and Labour were similar alternatives . 
Fourth ,  we estimate where the Alliance voters would have gone if Alliance were not in 
the race. In a race of only Labour and the Conservatives, where both parties maintain 
the same positions on the issues. Labour receives slightly greater proportions of former 
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Alliance voters. But in a two-way race where Labour can adjust their issue positions in 
the absence of the Alliance, we show that Labour could obtain about as many votes as 
the Conservatives. All this allows us to pit the two major competing theories of elections 
against each other: economic-voting vs issue-voting. 
1.1 Issue Voting in Britain 
Within a general discussion of how to model vote choice within multi-party systems, there 
exists a specific debate over the impact of prospective issues in British general elections. 
This is one debate which an alternative modeling strategy can resolve. The debate itself is 
especially prominent in discussions of the 1987 general election. On the one hand work by 
Crewe (1987) stresses short term factors and in particular incumbent performance, while 
Heath et al. (1991) stress longer term social changes and downplay the role of factors 
such as incumbent performance. Both approaches share an underlying conception which 
sees a 'normal vote' for political parties largely determined by long term social changes. 
Deviations from this can be explained in terms of short term election specific effects. 
Crewe argues that the election specific effects are large in 1987, Heath et al. argue they 
are small certainly for this one election, and possibly in general. 
The general thrust of Crewe's argument is to stress short term factors as relevant 
to vote choice . He notes that in "prosperity . . . lies the key to Conservative victory" 
(Crewe 1 987 352) . He argued that not only did people believe that both the economy 
in general and family living standards improved between Fall 1986 to Summer 1987 
and that there also existed a ''close coincidence" between economic perceptions and the 
Conservative/Labour vote. By that he seems to mean that Conservative voters generally 
thought the economy had done well . while Labour voters did not (see also Butler and 
Kavanagh 1988). 
Crewe ( 1987) also stresses t\\'o other factors. First, he notes that the Labour leader
Kinnock was a drag on the Labour party vote . \Vhile Kinnock marked a big improvement 
over the previous leader. i\ I i chael Foot. he \\'as still an electoral liability. Mrs . Thatcher, 
however. was an electoral asset for t he Conservative party. Second, Crewe claims that 
issue positions in general fa\'ored La hour (though defense was alleged to be a liability 
to Labour as it is to most left part if's. incl uding in a small way for the Alliance).2 For
Crewe, though. the central issuf' wa...; that of t he performance of the economy, and on this 
the Labour party was clearl:» at a disad\'antage based on public perception of a generally 
rebounding economy. 
Longer term social changes are made the centerpiece of the analysis by Heath et 
al. in their book Understanding Political Change (1 991). They argue that performance 
criteria (incumbency. campaigns and p e rsonal i ty ) can account for relatively little of the 
Conservative result of 1987 \\'hen com pared to earlier periods . Heath et al . 's argument 
is broader than the specific election of 1987, and often couched in relative terms (e.g.  
they compare results to a benchmark 1964 election and sometimes to a 1983 election). 
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Because of this it makes it difficult to state with any precision just what their argument is 
insofar as it specifically relates to 1987 but it does seem safe to state that they emphasize 
social changes such as a changing class structure, decline in religiosity and labor union 
membership as well as a rise in home ownership in explaining the Conservative victory. 
Among many other arguments, Heath et al. disagree with Crewe over the impact 
of issues. Heath et al. demonstrate their argument that issues have a relatively slight 
impact through a Downsian analysis. They take the position of respondents on five 1 1  
point policy scales and and assume that voters vote for the party which comes closest 
to their own position on each of the issues (Heath et al. 1991: 217). This is, of course, 
a straightforward arithmetic exercise on each issue. These individual issue distances are 
then combined into one overall scale and the same arithmetic is performed. For this 
overall measure the individual issues are added together with equal weight, which they 
justify, at least in part, by results which show no relationship between the reported 
importance of a given issue to vote choice and perceived policy distance between t he 
two main parties (Heath et al. 1991: 180-182). As the authors themselves recognize, 
in combining the issues scales, issues on which the parties are seen to be close together 
necessarily carry less weight in the overall calculation of distance (Heath et al. 1991: 
218). Assuming that each respondent would have voted for the party closest to them 
on this average distance scale, they claim that 28% would have voted Labour, 29% 
Alliance and 43% Conservative. Performance effects, which Heath et al classify as the 
short-term impact of the party on economic events and on issue considerations, are, at 
best, a residual category for them. They compare the predicted vote from their various 
simulations and the actual vote. Based on this, they claim that the combined impact of 
leadership/candidate effects plus incumbent performance effects plus pocket book effects 
gave the Conservative party 43 more than its 1964 total (and Labour 4% less). It is 
difficult to see how to translate a four point bonus between two elections over such a long 
period of time into some specific expectations about short term impacts, but it seems 
safe to say that Heath et al. do not think short term effects very important at all. 
G arrett's work occupies, in some ways. a sophisticated middle position between 
these two bodies of literat ure (Garre t t  1992). \\'hile anchoring a discussion of the 1987 
election firmly in an extensi\·e anal::si s of class a n d  socio-economic impacts he argues 
that the Conservatives' social reforms essentially shifted the preferences of the electorate 
as a whole to the right, and closer t o  the Conservative party. And, for Garrett, it is this 
shift which provides an essentially issu(' \'O t i ng basis for Conservative success. Thus while 
sharing Heath et al 's concern for social fo rces he also shares Crewe's concern for what 
might be  termed relatively short fac t or:,. H owever . in contrast to Crewe, who clearly sees 
retrospective and performance criteria a.s paramount, Garrett sees issue voting as much 
more central to the Consen·atiw \'ictory. 
In sum, the literature is d ivided on the issue of whether issues and retrospective 
economic evaluations matter very much in British elections. In part, the debaters talk 
past rather than to each other becausf' they have no unified model of vote choice which 
considers the choice over all three alternatives and which can offer precise estimates 
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of the impact of issues and the economy. More importantly, such a model would also 
allow direct estimation of how voters frame the voting choice, rather than relying upon 
a structure of choice imposed by the researcher. 
1.2 An Initial Look at Voting in 1987 
As an initial examination of the 1987 British election we present in Table 1 the percentage 
of voters supporting each party based upon respondents' demographic traits, economic 
perceptions, and issue positions. The data we use are taken from the 1987 British Election 
Study (Heath 1989) . In accord with common class-based theories of British elections,
there is a strong class-oriented effect seen in Table 1 .  While 53.4% of white-collar voters 
supported the Conservatives, Conservative support dropped to 34.6% among blue-collar 
workers . Similarly, 43 .4% of the blue-collar respondents voted Labour, while Labour 
support dropped to 20.6% among white-collar workers. However, there was no large 
distinction between Alliance voting rates for the two groups: Alliance received 22% of 
votes from blue-collar workers and 26% of votes cast by white-collar workers. 
[Table 1 Here) 
We also present the voting behavior of respondents based upon whether they 
thought inflation, unemployment and taxes had decreased, stayed the same, or increased 
in the past year . Economic factors appeared to enter strongly into the determination 
of voter choices between the Conservative and Labour party, but less strongly into the 
decision as to whether to rnte Alliance. The Conservative party did almost twice as 
well among those who felt inflation had stayed the same versus those who felt inflation 
had increased . Similarly, the Labour party did almost twice as well among voters who 
felt inflation had increased as among those who felt  inflation had stayed the same. Yet 
there is again very little difference in the Alliance vote-share between the two groups of 
voters: 22 . 1  % vs 26.8%. Similar patterns hold for respondents' voting behavior and their 
views of unemployment .and taxes . The Conservative party was punished by those who 
disapproved of economic performance: and it was Labour, not Alliance, that appeared to 
be the beneficiary of this disapprornl. 
The data in Table 1 for \'Oter issur' posit ions and vote choice indicate that these issue 
perceptions may also have plawd a l arge role in this election . We present the percentage 
of voters choosing each part�· based 011 their self-reported views on defense, on the relative 
importance of government e fforb to fight infla t ion or unemployment, on redistribution 
of income, and crime. Thosf' respoudents on the right of the issue on defense spending, 
government emphases on fight in� inflat ion or unemployment, redistribution of income, 
and crime, voted Conservati\'('. \\' hi lt· those on the left of the issues voted Labour. The 
Alliance seems to have picked up support abo u t  equally from voters describing themselves 
as moderate or liberal on the issues . and ran worse among voters describing themselves as
conservative on the issues. t a l ike recent l .S. elections, there is no gender-gap between 
the parties .  Each of the three parti es d oes almost identically well among men and women 
voters. 
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Unfortunately these bivariate relationships can tell us little about the relative im­
portance of class, economic evaluations, and issue-positions. To assess which set of factors 
were more important in this election, and to test the various accounts advanced about 
British elections in general, we need to turn to multivariate methods and develop a fully 
specified model of vote-choice. 
2 Models of Multi-Party Elections 
Any model of voter-choice should allow voters to consider simultaneously all three parties. 
It should allow voters to weigh the parties' positions on the issues, to consider the parties'
performance on the economy, and it should allow voters of different demographic traits 
to have different preferences for different parties. Also, and this is especially important 
to three party races, it should not impose the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives 
(IIA) property on the voters . 
The IIA property holds if the ratio of the probability of voter i choosing alternative 
C to the probability of voter i choosing alternative L does not depend upon the other 
alternatives available in the choice set. Technically, 
Pi(C)l{S} 
Pi(L )I{ S} 
Pi(C)l{T} 
Pi(L)l{T} 
(1) 
where Sand T are sets of alternatives, both containing C and L, and Pi(C)l{S} denotes 
the probability of the ith voter choosing the Conservative party from choice set S; and
Pi(C)l{ T} denotes the probability of choosing the Conservative party from an alternative 
set of choices, T. Pi(L) is defined similarly for Labour. 
Equation ( 1) says that given two choices - - C and L - - the ratio of the probability 
of  choosing choice C to the probability of choosing choice L does not change if the set
qf choices is altered from set S to set T. In other words, even if set S contained only 
choices C and L, but set T contained choi ces C and L, as well as ten other choices, the 
ith individual's relative probabilztzes of cho os ing C and L would be unchanged . In the
British case, IIA implies: 
P11Cll{C. L} 
I'1(L);{C.L} 
PJC)l{C. L. A} 
P1IL)l{C,L,A} (2) 
Or, IIA implies that the presencr or absP11ce o f  the Alliance would not change the relative 
probabilities of any single voter choosing between Conservative and Labour. This is a 
very strong substantive assumption t o  make about voters; an assumption it would be 
preferable not to make since it might not be true .  It suggests that voters are incapable of 
seeing one part;v· as a substitute for another party. For instance, under IIA a voter could 
not see the Alliance as a substi t utP for Labour. Say a voter has a probability of . 5  of 
voting for Labour and a probabili ty of .5 of voting for Conservative in a two-party race . 
Now with the Alliance. i f  IIA is maintained. the voter could not have probability of .5 of 
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voting for Conservative, and probability .25 of voting for each of Labour and Alliance. 
Yet such a scenario is quite plausible for a voter who sees no difference between Labour 
and Alliance and simply views them as identical left alternatives.3
Since we do not believe that such a strong substantive assumption should be made 
about voters in multi-party elections, we specify and estimate a model of voter-choice 
using M ultinomial Probit (MNP). MNP is a flexible estimation technique that does not 
impose IIA. This alone sharply distinguishes our research from all past published work 
on voter choice in multi-party systems, since all previous research used an estimation 
method which does impose the IIA restriction. And MNP allows for a very rich model 
specification . MNP is based on a random utility model, where each individual votes for 
the party for which she has the greatest utility. Random utility models assume that 
while individuals maximize their expected utility, these utilities are not known to the 
researcher with certainty and must be assumed to be random variables (Manski 1977). 
So, following the assumptions of random utility, we asume that each voter's utility is 
composed of an observed component (which we call the systemic component) and of an 
unobserved component (which we call the random component). The systemic component 
of utility can be specified with individual-specific variables, such as characteristics of the 
voter, and choice-specific variables, such as characteristics of the party; this allows a 
detailed examination in one empirical model of how differences among voters and parties 
influence voter choice. The random component of utility can arise from many sources: 
unobserved characteristics of the individual or the choice, variables which are measured 
imperfectly, or variables which are measured incorrectly (Ben-Akiva and Lerman 1985 ; 
Manski 1973 ) .  When we impose a specific set of assumptions about the distribution 
of the random component (here that they have a multivariate normal distribution) we 
obtain a specific random util ity model (here MNP).4 
The MNP model was developed by Hausman and Wise (1978). The Hausman and 
Wise ivINP model assumes utility to be a function of the characteristics of the choices. 
We follow the Alvarez-Nagler (Al\'arez and Nagler 1995b) implementation of M NP which 
assumes that the respondent· s utility is a function of choice-specific and individual-specific 
characteristics: 
where: 
1 �J = utility of the i1h voter for the /h part�·
a1 = characteristics of the i1h \'Oter 
Xii = characteristics of the /h party relative to the i1h voter
(3 )  
Wj = a vector of parameters relating the characteristics of a voter to the voter's utility 
for the  /h party
B = a vector of parameter;-; relating the relationship between the voter and the party 
(xi)) to the voter's utility for th c party
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Eij = random disturbance for the ith voter for the j'h party 
So we estimate one set of (J's (one for each prospective issue) , and two sets of 7/J's. One 
set of 7/J's examines the relative effect of each voter attribute on the likelihood of the voter 
choosing Conservative over Alliance, the second set of 'I/J's examines the relative effect of 
each voter attribute on the likelihood of the voter choosing Labour over Alliance. 5
Thus MNP offers us two advantages over Multinomial Logit (MNL) . First , because 
MNP allows for correlation among the disturbance terms in the model it removes the 
IIA restriction from voters. Second, because the underlying model specification is based 
upon the issue position of the voter relative to the party, we are_ able to postulate a more 
realistic model of voter behavior, and draw more interesting inferences about the effect 
of changes in party behavior . The specification we use is a 'conditional' specification: it 
is conditional upon the characteristics of the choices. The specification of MNL models 
is not conditional upon the characteristics of the choices (i .e. , the parties) , it is only 
dependent upon the characteristics of the voters. For example, an MNL model would 
include the voters' positions on the issues, but not the parties' positions on the issues. 
This can lead to sloppy inferences - as well as limiting our ability to understand the 
implications of movement by the parties. We observe that voters who are conservative 
on defense do not like Labour. We all know that this is not just because the voter is 
conservative on defense, but rather that such voters are far from Labour on the issue. 
The conditional specification - - measuring this distance from voter to party - - is a 
better representation of the true model. 6 
The flexibility of the ).1'.\TP technique gives us the opportunity to answer a number 
of questions about the 1981 British general election. First , we can determine the impact 
of a wide array of voter attributes 0n their choices in this election, controlling for many 
other competing factors. Second, we can examine the dynamics of party positions on 
prospective issues. Since the MNP technique allows us to consider the relative position 
of each of the three parties relative to voters, we can see how changes in party issue 
positions influence their expected vote shares . \Ve also can see what might occur in British 
elections were one party - the Alliance - to drop out of electoral politics altogether. 
Last, through our estimates of the error correlations, we can begin to ascertain how 
British voters '·group" the parties: instead of assuming certain groupings of the parties 
by the electorate, we estimate thesP groupings. J\o other estimation technique has the 
flexibility to examine each of these three areas. Thus we argue for the superiority of the 
MNP technique in empirical studies of multi-party elections . 
In particular, the .i\1'.\P techniqur is well-suited for the study of recent British 
elections . Since 1945 .  there have been three \'iable national parties in British politics , 
but it \Vas not until the dual elections of 1914 that the Liberal party, in this period 
the electorally-weakest party. began obtaining roughly 20% of the national vote. And 
in 1983. with the Liberal/Social Democratic Alliance (Alliance) obtaining 25 .4% of the 
national vote, just two percent lower than the Labour party, it looked as if British voters 
may have finally had a '·real" third alternative. Thus, the emergence of the Alliance as 
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an option offered British voters in 1983 and 1 987 three choices. 
Yet British voters presumably do not view these three choices as truly distinct 
alternatives. Common wisdom holds that the Alliance is a substitute for Labour, or at 
least closer to Labour than to the Conservative party. However, even with this common 
wisdom, few empirical papers consider the possibility of the grouping of choices nor the 
possible violation of the IIA assumption (for example, see McAllister and Studlar (1992)
or Stewart and Clarke ( 1992) on the 1987 British election) . The MNP model we use is 
useful precisely because it allows us to both test for the violation of the IIA assumption, 
and, if IIA is violated , the model will also provide us insight into the structure of the 
choice process. Is the Alliance considered by voters as a substitute for Labour? Is the 
Alliance seen by voters as a choice more similar to Labour than to the Conservative 
party? What would happen if the Alliance dissolved? The MNP model allows us to 
answer precisely these questions. 7 
2.1 A Model of the 1987 Election 
We view the voters' utility for each party to be a function of the voter's position on 
the issues relative to the party, and of characteristics of the voter which we describe 
below. The inclusion of issue variables in our models stems from the growing realization 
that "issues matter" in British elections ,  just as they "matter" in the electoral politics 
of many industrial democracies (Inglehart 1 977). This stems also from the realization 
that the effect of class in British elections has slipped considerably (Crewe 1974; Crewe, 
Sarlvik and Alt 1977: Sarlvik and Crewe 1 983 ) .  Working from the framework of the 
spatial m odel of elections. we include variables for the distance between the voter and 
each party on defense, government emphasis on inflation versus unemployment, taxes, 
redistribution of income. nationalization of industry. crime, and social welfare programs. 
The parties' position on each issue is taken to be the mean of the party placement on 
the 1 1  point issue scale by all respondents. We use the absolute value of the difference 
between respondents' position.and the party's position as a measure of issue-distance on 
each item .8
Hand in hand with t lw rPalization that issues are replacing class in framing voter 
decisions in British elections is a gro\\'ing realization of the effects of voter perceptions 
of the economy. This has occup1Pd mucli of the em pirical work on British elections (Alt 
1 979: Lewis-Beck 1 988: Studlar . \!c...\llist er and Ascui 1 990). Accordingly, we include
in our models variables for th<' respori d en t ·s perceptions of recent changes in inflation, 
unemployment, and taxation le\·el s  ( \!c . ..\l lister and Studlar 1 992). This allows a test of
the retrospective voting model in a t hrer-party setting. 
We also include demographic measures of the respondents. To allow for the pos­
sibility that class did matter in the 1987 election, we also include a number of control 
variables . First. we have an indicator of the voters' class affiliation: whether the voter 
occupied a blue-collar occupatior1 or not .9 Cnion membership has long been considered 
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a staple of Labour support, but it is possible that this source of support has dimin­
ished considerably with the dismantling of the trade union movement during the first 
two Thatcher administrations. We include a dummy variable for trade union members 
to examine the effect of union membership on voter-choice. As a third control for the 
effects of class, we have a dummy variable which measures whether or not the voter was 
a public-sector employee.10 
Demographic variables other than class have loomed large in research on British 
elections. The regional divisions in recent British elections have spurred a .flurry of 
works on regional influences on voting, even though the growing North-South political 
cleavage in British voting may be  more of an artifact of economic divisions than anything 
specific to certain regions (Crewe 1992; McAllister and Studlar 1992). We include regional 
dummy variables in our models to test these assertions. With the massive sales of council 
houses d uring the Thatcher years, no doubt motivated to appeal to the moderately well­
off working classes, it is asserted that home ownership played some role in Thatcher's 
success in 1987 (Crewe 1992 ) .  Accordingly, we have a dummy variable in the model for 
home ownership. We also include measures of the respondent's age, sex, income, and 
education. 
2.2 MNP Estimates 
We present the multinomial probit estimates in Table 2 .  The estimates for the issue 
distance variables are in the first seven rows; recall that we assume these effects to be 
constant across the parties. The other independent variables follow arranged in two 
columns. T he first column contains coefficients for the Conservatives relative to the 
Alliance; the second column contains coefficients for Labour relative to Alliance. In the 
last three rows of Table 2 we presen t  the estimates for the three error correlations. The 
standard-error for each coefficient  is presented below the coefficient. 
[Table 2 Here] 
. T hese estimates sh<;>d substantial light ou a number of hypotheses. First, notice 
that all of the issue distance vanahfr., 11111•1 statistically significant effects. Thus, each of 
these issues had a significant rffect on \'OtPr choice in this election, controlling for all of 
the other variables in the model. Tlw furt lwr a \'Oler was from each party on each issue, 
the less likely the voter was tc1 m t (· f()r t i 1 at part\'. Additionally, some issues (defense, 
taxation, and nationalization) app<·<m·d to haw· had stronger effects on voter choice 
than the other issues, especially redistribution. crime . and government policy towards 
unemployment and inflation .  
Perceptions of the nation al ecor1omy also affected voters' choices. We find that both 
perceptions of recent changes in inf1ation and in unemployment had a significant impact 
on Conservative voting relati\'( ' t(I All1a11ce voting. For both variables, the positive sign 
implies that people who sa\\' that inf1ation or unemployment had gotten better in the past 
year were significantly more li ke!�- to \'Ote Conservative than Alliance. Neither of these 
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variables, nor the truces variable, had a significant impact on determining whether a voter 
chose Labour over Alliance. This suggests that voters did not distinguish between Labour 
and Alliance based on retrospective economic issues. Thus as the retrospective model 
predicts, the incumbent party was punished or rewarded for respondents' views of the 
economy. However, apparently neither Alliance nor Labour convinced voters that they 
were the superior alternative on this dimension as the two challenging parties divided 
equally the spoils. Notice that this is different than the inference one could draw from 
Table 1 .  The bivariate results in Table 1 suggested that Labour won the votes of those 
dissatisfied with economic performance. But that relationship disappears in a fully­
specified model. 
The variables used to control for the effects of class-based voting in Britain (union
members, public sector employees , blue collar workers, family income, and education) 
confirm the posited class-bias in voting between the three parties. Union members are 
significantly less likely to vote Conservative than Alliance, but more likely to vote Labour 
over Alliance. Family income shows a similar effect , with higher income voters being more 
likely to vote Conservative than Alliance, while being more likely to vote Alliance than 
Labour. Labour also had a large advantage over the other two parties with blue-collar 
voters .11
Last ,  we give the estimated error correlations at the bottom of Table 2. These 
account for factors not included in the systemic component of our multinomial probit 
specification , which are correlated across parties. Two of these three error correlations are 
statistically significant, t hose for the error correlation between Labour and Alliance ( .34) 
and for Conservatives and Labour (- . 39 ) .12 The three error correlations imply that British
voters saw the Labour and Alliance parties as similar ( i .e . ,  as substitutes), but that the 
Conservative and Labour parties were viewed as clearly distinct . This lends support to 
two interpretations . First . British \'Oters saw this election as a choice between a ruling 
incumbent party and two al ternatives . similar to the usual theory of incumbent-based 
retrospective \'oting (Key 1966 ) .  That leads to a decision rule which would have British 
voters deciding whether to su pport the incumbent party or not, and if not, choosing 
between the Labour and Alliance part.\·. Second .  these error correlations can be seen as 
indicating an ideological struct ure to t h e <lrci sion m aking process for British voters in 
1987, with the Conservatin' part\· seen a.c; ideologically distinct, and \Vith the Labour 
and Alliance seen as ideol ogically s i m ila r . Botb of the first two interpretations could be
correct.13
.Methodologically, thrsr sip1ihcant error corrrlation estimates demonstrate that the 
"independence of irrelevant altrrnati \'<'<. rnndition will be violated , and estimation tech­
niques such as multinomial l ogit \\'hicl 1  i m p ose this assumption on the data are likely 
to produce incorrect infere11ces about rnter decisions in this election. This helps under­
score our belief that this is a restrict i\'e a.c;sum ption to make about voters in multi-party 
elections . 
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2.3 Effects of Economics and Issues 
As with most discrete choice models, the coefficients from the multinomial probit model 
are difficult to interpret directly. The model is highly nonlinear, and the impact of 
estimated coefficients are all dependent upon the values taken by the other variables 
and coefficients in the model. Thus to obtain more informative interpretations of these 
results, we move to a series of secondary analyses of the estimated effects of the economy 
and issues in the 1987 British election. 
Our first illustration of the substantive meaning of the multinomial pro bit estimates 
from Table 2 is through "first differences" (King 1989). First, we set all of the variables 
in the model at hypothetical values, and determine the probability that this hypothetical 
voter would support each of the three parties. The hypothetical voter we postulate here 
has a . 34 probability of supporting the Conservatives, a .40 probability of supporting 
Labour, and a .26 probability of supporting the Alliance.14 Then we alter one independent
variable at a time and recompute predicted probabilities for the hypothetical voter with 
all other variables held at their 'initial' value. The difference between these probabilities 
is the effect of the change in the independent variable of interest. 
The estimated first differences for the three retrospective evaluations of the national 
economy and for four of the issue distance variables are given in Table 3. At the top 
of the table we give the baseline probabilities for our hypothetical voter. Then for each 
variable of interest we show the marginal effect on support for each of the parties of 
changing the values of that independent variable from one end of the scale to the other. 
Beginning with the retrospective economic evaluations, notice that respondents' views 
of inflation and unemployment had a stronger effect on the choice of parties for our 
hypothetical voter than did changes in views of taxation. The first differences for change 
in Conservative support are . 2 4  (inflation ) . .  24 (unemployment) and .06 (taxation). Thus, 
our hypothetical voter would be .24 more likely to vote for the Conservative candidate if 
they thought that either inflation or unemployment had improved in the past year rather 
than had gotten worse, but only . 06 more likely to vote Conservative if they thought 
taxation had become better over the past year. And notice that these changes in support 
seem to come equally from Labour and All iance . The probability of our hypothetical 
voter choosing Labour could change Ii\' . 1 3 based on his view of inflation; his probability 
of choosing Alliance could changP lff . 1 1  ha.-;ecJ 011 inflation .  The results for unemployment 
are similar. Thus apparent!.\· nPit hPr Allianc<' nor Labour convinced voters that they were 
the superior economic al terna t i\'(' :\ga111. \\'(' hncl support for the retrospective model: 
the estimated impact of changes in \·i('w:-- of the economy is huge. Yet we also find that 
the retrospective model does not illuminat<' the choice between the two out-parties . The 
estimates for issue effects presentPd next ho\\'ever, do show how voters chose between the 
two out-parties. 
[Table 3 Here] 
·we present similar results for four issues - redistribution, welfare, crime, and 
defense - in Table 3 .  Here we mm·p the voter's position from one end of each issue 
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dimension to the other, keeping the party positions constant. While perhaps an extreme 
movement , it helps to demonstrate the power of issues in British politics, controlling for 
class and other demographic effects. These four issues have a dramatic effect on whether 
or not our hypothetical voter supports the Conservative or Labour party. Moving our 
hypothetical voter from the left to the right on each of these four issue scales increases 
the probability that he supports the Conservative candidate by as much as .21 . Defense 
has the strongest impact on our hypothetical voter, followed by welfare, redistribution, 
and crime .  Notice that there is little change in the probability of our hypothetical voter 
choosing Alliance party when we move the voter from the left to the right on these four 
issues. All the changes occur between the Conservative and Labour party. 
The results for issue effects are not surprising when we consider the fact that the 
Alliance party staked out moderate positions - between the Conservatives and Labour 
- on each of the issues we examine .  Table 4 displays the mean positions of the parties 
and respondents on each of the seven issue scales. These issue scales are 1 1-point scales, 
and the positions of the parties (the average positions taken from voter placements of the 
parties in the survey data) show a large amount of separation between the Conservative 
and Labour parties in this election. On welfare and defense (the two issues with the 
largest effect in Table 3), the differences between the Conservative and Labour parties 
are substantial , over 3 points on these scales. For crime, the issue with the least effect 
in Table 3 ,  notice that the parties staked out very similar positions, with only about one 
point on these scales separating each party.15
[Table 4 Here] 
This supports the implications of theoretical discussions in the literature about 
American national elections. Early debates by Shepsle ( 1972) and Page (1978) both 
showed, in the context of differen'. models of campaign dynamics, that candidates and 
campaigns often have the strategic incentive to obfuscate their positions to the electorate, 
echoing work by Key ( 1 966 ) .  I f  the voters cannot perceive a distinction between the 
parties on certain issues, it is difficult for those issues to factor strongly in voter decision 
:making (Alvarez 1996 ) .  Here we see strong support for the obvious implication of these 
models, since the issues \\'ith the most party separation are the issues with the most 
influence on our hypothetical \'Oter. \\.('also see that on every issue except crime Alliance 
was closer to the mean respondent position than each of the other two parties. 
2 .4 Effect of the Alliance 
Since we can predict the prohahil i t:· o f  an indi\'idual respondent choosing each of the 
three parties using the Jv1I'\P esti mat es . \\'<' can also predict the aggregate vote-share of 
each of the three parties. >.lore' importantly. the MNP estimates allow us to predict 
aggregate rnte-share in a two-part'// race \\'ith Alliance omitted: we are able to use the 
estimates from the s�'stemic component of utilit�· for the remaining two parties as well as 
the information in the estimated corrrlations between the disturbance terms to predict 
the probability of each voter choosing the Labour or Conservative parties. This allows us 
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to estimate the impact of Alliance on the election. We predict a 44.9%-29.8%-25.3% split 
in a three-way race; this gives Labour a 39.9% share of the two-party vote between the 
Conservative party and Labour. If Alliance disappears, leaving a two-way race between 
the Conservative party and Labour, we predict a 57.4%-42.6% split. Thus the removal 
of the Alliance helps Labour somewhat. However, to see the real impact of the Alliance 
on the election we need to take a more dynamic view of the election and consider the 
behavior of the parties as well as the voters. In the following section we consider such 
behavior by the parties: we simulate the effects of changes in issue positions by the three 
parties. 
2.5 The Issues 
Changes in respondents' ideological positions may not be as interesting to consider as 
changes in parties' ideological positions. After all , a major criticism of the Labour party 
is that they have taken positions that have led to their being placed far from the center 
of mass of voters. What would happen if Labour convinced voters that the party were 
more moderate? Could Labour have done better by trying to move to alternative issue 
positions? To find out, we moved Labour's perceived position on each of the seven issue 
dimensions, one issue at a time. We then recomputed the distance from each respondent 
to Labour on the issues, and then computed new predicted vote-shares for each party, 
with Labour at the postulated position. 
We perform these calculations both with the Alliance present, and under the 
counter-factual scenario of a t\vo--party race between Labour and the Conservative party 
with the Alliance omitted . As the simulation will show, the effects of movement by the 
parties i n  a three-party race are much smaller than the effects of movement by the parties 
in a two-party race. In Table 5a we show :  the position on each issue at which Labour 
would h ave received its lowest share of the vote; Labour's actual (mean perceived) po­
sition on each issue; and the position on each issue Labour would have had to be at to 
maximize its vote-share ( indicated by Labour-i'vlax* ) .  We also show the predicted vote­
share of all three parties had Labour been perceived to be at Labour-Max* on each issue, 
and in the final row of the table we show the predicted vote-shares for the parties had 
Labour moved to Labour- � Iax·  simultaneously on all seven issues. Labour's predicted 
vote-share based on its actual percei ved positions on the issues was 29 .8% . According to 
Table 5a ,  the best Labour cou ld do h.\· sh if t i11g  on any one issue would be to increase its 
predicted vote-share to 32 . 49(  by mm·ing from the left to the center on the Nationaliza­
tion issue .  If Labour shifted publ i c  pcrcPption of its positions on all seven issues , then 
it would still receive a pred icted vote-share of only 36 . 2%; this is an increase of 6 .4%, 
but would still leave Labour almost 59( behind the Conservative party. Thus while Table 
5a provides guidance as to where the Labour party should move on the issues, it also 
clearly indicates that issue positions i n  and of themselves, cannot account for Labour's 
poor electoral fortunes. 
[Tab le 5a Here] 
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The apparent magnitude (or lack thereof) of these issue effects might be surprising 
given the estimates presented in Table 3 .  For instance, we predict that a respondent 
changing their view on defense could increase their probability of voting for Labour by 
.24 ;  yet Table 5a indicates that Labour only has 2.2% to gain by moving on defense, 
not 24%. This is because the impact of movement by a party is limited by two things. 
First, moving closer to some voters necessarily means moving further from other voters. 
Second, the issue-space is crowded. Labour is competing with two other parties, and any 
movement towards the center will leave it closer to another party which it must share 
voters with. 
The second problem described above might lead supporters of Labour to hope for 
better results if Alliance would simply disappear and leave the issue-space less crowded. 
The MNP estimation technique allows us to predict the probability of a voter choos­
ing Labour or Conservative without Alliance as an option. As stated earlier, we are 
able to utilize the information obtained from the MNP estimates, the impact on the 
respondents' utility of his/her distance from the parties as well as the correlation among 
disturbances , to estimate how voters would behave in the absence of Alliance. We per­
formed simulations identical to those presented in Table 5a, moving Labour on each issue 
and reestimating vote-shares to find Labour's optimal position ,  in a two-party race with­
out Alliance . As reported in Table 5b ,  Labour's maximum share of the vote in a two-way 
race by moving on any single issue is 45 .4%. By moving on all seven issues, Labour's 
hypothetical vote-share rises to 49.8%. Note that this is higher than Labour's largest 
share of the two-party vote reported in Table 5a (36.2 / (36.2 + 41 .9) = 46.4%) . Thus
we very clearly see the problem Alliance causes for Labour. By positioning itself in the 
center on the issues, Alliance both takes votes from Labour , and minimizes the ability of 
Labour to improve its vote-share by strategic movement on the issues. 
[Table 5b Here] 
vVe shm,· in Tables 6a and 6b identical simulations, but focusing on the Conserva­
tive party. In Table 6a. notice. that our est imates reveal that the Conservatives took more 
conservative stances that electorall>· necessary on all issues but crime .  Thus, slight mod­
eration in the Conservatiye message in 1 987 would have produced small vote-share gains 
for the Conservatives . rangin g  from j ust U ll d Pr 1 C/( for moderating on nationalization and 
redistribution to almost 37< for mod ernuon on defense. Notice also the combined effect 
of moving the Conservatives to t h P i r  opt i m al posi t ion on all of the issues at once - they 
win with 6 1 3  of the vote. F i n al h· .  H'!l l o\· i r 1 g  t h e  All iance while moving the Conservatives 
to their best position on each iss u < · prod u c<'s over\\'helming Conservative victories on each 
issue (Table 6b) . 
[Tables 6a and 6b Here] 
·we performed similar s imulat ions for the Alliance, and present the results in Table 
7. On every issue other thall crimr t h e  A l liance managed to position itself closer to the
public than either the Conse n·at i \'( ' o r  Labor party. Thus Alliance really had less to 
gain by modifying its posi t ions .  and \\'e see in Table 7 that its actual position was quite 
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close to its optimal position on most issues. The delicate balancing act of the Alliance 
is apparent in the second and third columns of Table 7. Alliance was slightly to the 
left of its optimal position on defense, nationalization and crime; and was slightly to the 
right of its optimal position on the Phillips curve, taxation, redistribution and welfare .  
Had the Alliance taken its optimal position on any particular issue it  would never exceed 
the vote-share of the Labour party. Even by taking the optimal positions on all of these 
issues - engaging further in their delicate positioning between the parties - the Alliance 
would have only come very close (less than one percentage point) to overtaking Labour
in the 1987 election. 
[Table 7 Here] 
2 . 5 . 1  The Economy 
Yet parties, especially the incumbent party, have more strategic levers to operate than 
just their position on issues. For instance, there has long been debate over whether the 
economy matters in national elections, and whether the incumbent party has sufficient 
tools to manipulate the macroeconomy for electoral purpose (Alesina 1987; Alt 1 985;
Alvarez, Garrett and Lange 1991; Hibbs 1987; Lewis-Beck 1988; Tufte 1978) . We have
already shown in Tables 2 and 3 that variables measuring the voter's retrospective eval­
uation of recent economic performance mattered greatly in the 1987 British election, 
controlling for issue , class, and other demographic effects. 
B ut these results are quite static , and tell us little about the dynamics of the 
macroeconomy and voter preferences. We would like to know what to expect if overall 
macro-economic conditions changed . In Table 8 we give simple survey frequencies on 
the three economic retrospective evaluations in 1987 and 1992. We are interested in 
understanding how the British economy appeared to voters in 1987 relative to another 
benchmark . and we chose the 1 992 election since the survey questions in the 1992 British 
General Election study are almost identical to those in the 1987 data. · 
Notice, the distributions of public opinion shifted dramatically on inflation and 
unemployment. From 1 987 to 1 99 2 .  man!· more British voters felt that the economy had 
worsened considerably, with l 97r more voters seeing inflation as increasing a lot, and 
24% more voters seeing unemplo!·ment  as i ncreasing a lot in 1 992 .  Even taxes seemed to 
be increasing to the BritislJ . \\· i t b  l 2 .87r m ore voters seeing taxes as having increased a 
lot in this period .  
[Table 8 Here] 
This implies that, relative to 1 99 2 .  the economy in 1987 was more favorable to 
the Conservatives - the incumbent party - and that the economic conditions in 1987 
may have enhanced the Conservat iw· \'ictory that year. We can see the effect that the 
economy had in  1987 by using the multinomial probit results to simulate the predicted 
vote shares for the three parties under the scenario that the 1987 economy was as bad 
for the Conservatives as it appears t o  have been in 1 992. 
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In Table 9 we present a series of simulations which change the aggregate distribution 
of economic perceptions among voters in 1987 to match those held by voters in 1992. We 
begin by presenting the sample distribution of vote shares in 1 987, and then simulate the 
effects of changing voter retrospective economic perceptions across the different variables: 
inflation, unemployment , and truces. Here there is a surprising result . If we make the 
economy as "bad" for the Conservatives as it appeared to be in 1992, that is , we have 
substantial numbers of British voters who felt that inflation, unemployment and truces 
had all increased considerably in the past year, we still see the Conservatives winning 
the 1987 election. The difference between the first row and the last row in Table 9 shows 
only a 3. 7% loss for the Conservatives, which is split between Labour, which gains 1 . 6% 
of the vote share and Alliance, which gains 2 .1  % of the vote .  Thus, while an important 
predictor of which party individuals supported in 1987, the state of the macroeconomy 
does not seem to have determined the outcome of the 1987 British election. Had the 
economy been as bad as it \vas in 1992, the Conservatives still would have won over 40% 
of the vote .  
[Table 9 Here) 
3 Conclusion and Discussion 
We have uncovered factors driving the decision of the British voter in simultaneously 
choosing between three parties. The decision on whether to support the Conservative 
party in 1987 was largely retrospective: economic evaluations of individual voters were 
crucial to determining the likelihood of voting for the Conservatives. However, individual 
economic evaluations had very little impact on the choice between Labour and Alliance in 
1987; rather issue positions had a huge impact on the likelihood of voting for the Labour 
party. Thus we see that voters supported the incumbent party based on the economic 
performance : then chose between the two remaining alternatives based on issues. 
\Ve also have shown that All iance takes more votes from Labour than from the Con­
servatives . fl.fore important ly. we haw shown that the Alliance severely limits Labour's 
strategic options and leaves Labour al most no chance of winning an election . Alliance 
simply crowds Labour in t li e  issue-space. E\'en moving to the correct position on the 
issues, and a dismal econom\· \\'ou ld  u o t  he l p Labour if Alliance remained . Of course our 
analysis also reveals that L a b o u r  i s  n ot IH' lp ing  i t s  own cause by choosing issue positions 
so far to the left .  \\.hat d oe:-- t l1 1 s  s a\· a ho u :  " sh ort - t erm " vs "long-term" effects? It says
they both matter. and that L a l > o t 1 r h<L" l011g- term problems. Our contribution here is 
to m easure the short-term e ffects a n d  d('T1umstrate their magnitude. Similar analyses of 
British elections over time ( a  proJ ff t  hPyon d  t lw scope of this paper) could offer similar
measurement of the long-term fac tors. 
Both these findings sho\\' t hat rrtrospec t i ve and prospective issues matter greatly 
in British elections . The t rans l a t i on of both models of voting from their usual two­
party setting to the morr com pl i cated multi-party setting shows the resiliance of these 
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models and the differences between the two types of political settings. In multi-party 
settings, past economic performance can be used by voters when they decide to support 
the incumbent party or not. In multi-party settings, prospective issues factor heavily 
into both the calculations by parties and voters. Our results show that prospective issues 
positions are the criteria used by voters to decide which non-incumbent party to support. 
These findings come as the consequence of significant methodological advances in 
our examination of the 1987 British election. We have used a technique new to the study 
of multi-party elections, multinomial pro bit ,  which has given us the ability to study voter 
choices for the three major parties in this election simultaneously and without restrictive 
and erroneous assumptions. about the parties and the electorate. The MNP technique 
also gives us a unique perspective on the dynamics of multi-party politics, since we can 
determine the effects of changes in the positions of the parties on the choices of British 
voters. We can also determine the effects of changes in the party system - in this case, 
the effects of removing the Alliance from the election - on voter choices. The ability of 
the MNP technique to study these components of party politics is unique, since none of 
the alternatives advanced in the literature can answer these questions. 
While our focus has been on the role of prospective and retrospective issues in this 
British election, we differ from past work on British elections by examining the effects of 
both types of issues by simultaneously allowing for these, and other, influences on voter 
choice. Here we have simultaneously modeled the effects of prospective issues, economic 
issues; region, class , and other social attributes of individual voters. Few studies of 
British elections can make this claim. That we find prospective and retrospective issues 
to have such strong effects on the choices made by British voters, while controlling for 
region, class, and demographic characteristics, should end the debate over whether issues 
and the economy "matter'' in British elections. Instead, the focus should shift towards 
discussion of "hov.; much" prospectiw and retrospective issues matter, and how their 
impact in particular elections contrasts to other British elections, and to elections in 
other similar nations. Only then can British elections be placed in their appropriate 
comparative context. 
But  this work has general impl ications to all multi-party systems, since they are 
usually seen as qualitati\·ely d is t inc t  from t wo party systems (Duverger 1954, Sartori 
1976 ) .  Political science h as bec11  c a p t  i \·ated w ith the notion that two-party systems 
imply stability and mult i - par t \· s.\· s tem� i m· i t e  fiuidity. and hence chaos, ever since the 
collapse of the Weimer Rep u bl ic  J t ,  H m\'('\'< ' r .  wi t b \'ery few exceptions most approaches to 
studying voter behavior in m u l t i - pan \· s.\'S t Prns suppress the very multi-partyism which 
make such systems interesting. In m ul t i - party systems we do not expect parties to 
converge to the center, so t h P  st ratPgic calculation of parties about where to position 
themselves on the issues relat i \'C t o  t h{' \'O t crs is crucial for understanding the politics of 
these systems. Parties are also more l ikPly to drop out, or new parties are more likely to 
enter. in multi-part:.· systems . \\"p ha\'P demonstrated that the presence of a third party 
crowding up the issue spacP does increase thr likelihood of an extreme party winning 
the election. Vv'e have als o s hown tha t  if a party drops out of a multi-party system, it 
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provides opportunities for the existing parties to redefine themselves in the issue-space 
to appeal to a larger set of voters . 
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Notes 
1 .  Whitten and Palmer ( 1995) use multinomial logit to study the choices of British voters 
for the three parties in the 1987 election. While multinomial logit does provide 
statistical efficiency compared to successive binary logits, Whitten and Palmer are 
mistaken when they imply that their multinomial logit results differ substantively 
from a series of binary choice models comparing the two-party pairings. More 
importantly, by only having voter-specific characteristics as independent variables , 
rather than measures which incorporate the party's issue positions, Whitten and 
Palmer are unable to determine the impact of movements by the parties on the 
issues , which is one of the fundamental substantive concerns of the recent literature 
on British elections. See Alvarez and Nagler (1995a) for further discussion of this 
point . 
2 .  However, we provide contrary evidence in Table 4. 
3. This is an extreme case as most voters could distinguish between Labour and the
Alliance, but the point should be clear. 
4. By making other assumptions about the distribution of the random component we
obtain different random utility models. If we assume the random component has a 
type I extreme value distribution and is independently and identically distributed, 
we obtain a flexible form of the multinomial logit model (McFadden 1973) which 
imposes the IIA assumption . Alternatively, by assuming the random component 
has a generalized extreme-value distribution, we obtain a form of the nested logit 
model which allows for very limited relaxation of the IIA assumption (McFadden 
1978) .  
5 .  We also estimate three error correlations. I n  this analysis the disturbances are assumed 
to be multivariate normal . with mean zero and covariance matrix E .  The off­
diagonal elements of :..:: give the correla tions between pairs of disturbances, assuming 
that variance of each d is t u rban c< '  is  one .  
6 .  Conditional Logit (CL) wo u l d  a l l < )\\. 1 1 :-- t o  rnodPl  the position of the voter relative to 
the parties : but wou l d  s t i l l  i rn p os( '  I I ..\ .  T h us CL is to be much preferred to MNL; 
but is not as general as \ l \ P. 
7. These models can also gi \'e i nsig h t  i n to t h e  d:rnamics of the possible groupings of
choices by British vot ers . I t  is q u i t <' possible that as party fortunes change, as 
their positions and general idPo l ogi <'s chan ge . or as they go in and out of control 
of Parliament, that the similarit irs \'Oters see between the parties may change as 
wel l .  
8 .  By usin g  the distance from t h e  respon d ents ' self-placement to the mean placement of 
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each party - - rather than the distance from the respondents' self-placement to the 
respondents' placement of the party - we avoid contaminating our measure with 
the tendency of respondents to project their favored candidates closer to their own 
ideal issue position. 
9. Categories one through six of the occupation variable (as well as military) were coded
as blue-collar; see Heath ( 1989) for a full listing of the occupation codes. 
10 . We have examined alternative operationalizations for the role of class in this election.
In particular, we used the Heath-Goldthorpe categorization of individuals into oc­
cupation groups (Salariat, Routine nonmanual, Petty bourgeoisie, Foremen and 
technicians, and working class [Heath et al . 1985] ) .  This alternative specification 
of class did not add explanatory power to our model, and we do not present those 
results here. They are available from the authors. 
1 1 .  As mentioned earlier, we also used the Heath-Goldthorpe classification system of indi­
viduals into occupation-class groups. These classifications were added to the MNP 
model discussed in the text, and we re-estimated our model with four dummy vari­
ables for Salariat , Petty bourgeoisie, routine nonmanual and foremen and techni� 
cians (the working class was the excluded category) . A likelihood ratio test between 
this expanded model and the one presented in the text produced a x2 value of 5 .8 ,  
which is well below the critical x2 value of 15 .5  with 8 degrees of freedom. This 
means that the addition of the Heath-Goldthorpe variables do not contribute sta­
tistically to the explanatory power of our model. Additional examination of the 
results of the expanded model shows that all coefficients of interest in our analysis
- in particular, the estimates for issue distances, retrospect ive economic evalua­
tions, and the error correlati ons - are not significantly different between these two 
specifications. These results are available from the authors. 
1 2 .  \Vere none of the error correlat ions sig-nificantly different than 0 then we could not 
reject the Conditional Logi t model .  Cond itional Logit and MNP share the same 
systemic component of th emodels. the u t i l ity for each choice is conditional upon 
the characteristics .of the ch o i ce ac; \\'ell ac; thr \'Oter, but CL assumes independent 
disturbances . 
1 3 .  The M.[';'P estimates of b o t h  t h < '  ra n d o m  and s::s t emic components of our model are 
based on the assump t io u o f  s 1 u c e r 1 ·  \'O t i n g  i n  the 1 981 British election . Sincere 
voting occurs when prnpl ( ·  rnt ( ' for t he i r  most preferred candidate without tak­
ing into account that can d i d a t <' · s chancrs:  strategic voting occurs when people 
compare their preferences a n d  t he c an d i d atr's chances and for for a less-preferred 
candidate rather than \\'ac; t < ' t he i r  \'O t e  ( A.bramson , Aldrich, Paolino and Rohde 
1 99 2 ) .  \Vhile theoreticalh· t b rre an' reasons based on the calculus of voting (Downs 
1 95 7 ;  McKelvey and Ordesh ook 1 97� :  Riker and Ordeshook 1968) to suspect that 
strategic \'Oting occurs . empi rical support for strategic voting in multi-party or 
multi-candidate elec t io ns h as been found only in Canadia� elections (Black 1978) , 
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American presidential primaries (Abramson, Aldrich, Paolino and Rohde 1992) , 
and British elections (Cain 1978; Franklin, Niemi and Whitten 1994; Galbraith 
and Rae 1989; Health et al. 1991 ;  Johnston and Pattie 1991 ;  Niemi, Whitten and 
Franklin 1992) . Perhaps the limited evidence is due to the fact that few voters con­
sider that their vote has an effect on the eventual outcome of the election (Barry 
1970; Ferejohn and Fiorina 1974, 1975) . In any case, we re-estimated the MNP 
model presented in Table 2 with three variables which measured whether each of 
the parties came last in the voter's constituency in 1983. We expect that these co­
efficients ought to · be negative if voters acted strategically in 1987. We found that 
each of these coefficients was negative, and that two (Conservatives and Labour be­
ing last in the constituency) were statistically significant. Most important, though, 
is the fact that the other estimates in our model are not influenced by the addition 
of the strategic voting variables. Thus the interpretations of the MNP results in 
this paper are not influenced by sophisticated voting behavior. We leave the issue 
of strategic voting in this election for a subsequent paper. 
14 .  The hypothetical voter is set to be at the sample mean distance from each party on 
each issue. This voter is male, a blue-collar union member, from the north, who 
owns his own home. He is also of mean income, education, and age. Last, his 
perceptions of the economy were also set to the sample mean values. While the 
actual values of the independent variables we use to construct our hypothetical voter 
do influence the baseline probability estimates, they do not have much influence on 
the important quantit ites - the probability differences. In other words, different 
hypothetical voters ,,·ou l d  still produce the probability differences we present in 
Table 3 .  
15 .  The issue placements in Table -1 i llustrate the error involved in many analyses of 
British elections - assu m i ng t h e  A l li ance party to be positioned exactly between 
the Conservatives and t he Labour party ( c . f. McAllister and Mughan 1 987; Mishler 
et al. 1 989 ) .  On some issues l i ke defense . the Alliance was virtually positioned at 
a point midway bet\\'t='rn t h e  t wu m ajor parties. But on many social issues -
examples here are redist r i bu t ion a n rl we l fare - notice that the position of the 
Alliance is much closer tCJ La hour\ t b a n  to the Conservatives. Making incorrect 
assumptions abou t p a r t \· pos i t  1 o u s  cl early w i l l  lead to inaccurate understandings 
of British elections. 
1 6 . One articulation of this \' i (• \•: i :-- IL  [ J h ! ( ' l l !  ( 1 9G'/ ) .  In  general , party system attributes 
( l ike the number of part  1c:-- 1 ar ( '  a rgued to be a strong factor in determining a na­
tion 's political stab i l i ty ( A l rn o l ! d  1 9GO :  Dm·erger 1954 ;  Huntington 1968; Lipset 
and Rokkan 1967: Powel l  E l S l .  1 9� 2 :  Sartor i  1976) . ]\fore recently, Bartolini and 
Mair argued: "the nurn l > n o f  pa r t  i e:-- m at ters,  and variance in this number con­
tributes substantially t \ I  t l } ( '  < 'xpl a l l a t i on of variance in electoral stability ( 1 990: 
1 43 ) . 
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Table 1:  
Vote Choice By Respondents' Views and Characteristicsa 
Conservative Labour Alliance 
3 N 3 N 3 N 
Class White-Collar 53.4 908 20.6 351 26.0 442 
Blue-Collar 34.6 458 43.4 574 22.0 291 
Infiationb Decreased 62.5 5 12.5 1 25.0 2 
Same 56.4 898 21 .5 342 22.1  352 
Increased 32.5 467 40.8 587 26.8 385 
Unemployment!' Decreased 59.6 31 25.0 13 15.4 8 
Same 60.2 844 19.5 274 20.3 284 
Increased 30.4 468 4 1 .2 634 28.3 436 
Taxesb Decreased 65.9 56 17.6 15 16.5 14 
Same 48.4 1 1 75 27.0 654 24.6 597 
Increased 23.8 64 53.5 144 22.7 61 
Defensec Conservative 64.3 288 19.6 88 16.1 72 
Moderate 56.3 839 18.0 269 25.7 383 
Liberal 21 .5  229 52.9 563 25.6 272 
Phillips Curvec Conservative 72. 1 243 1 2 .8 43 15.1  5 1  
J\loderate 64 .4  383 13.3 79 22.4 133 
Liberal 35.2 732 38.4 798 26.4 548 
Redistribution' Conser\'at i ve 74 . 9  61 6 6.9 57 18.1  149 
J\foderate 49 .7  362 22.1 161 28.2 205 
Liberal 25 .2  359 48.8 697 26.0 371 
Crimec Conser\'ati ve 50.8 834 27 . 6 453 21 .6  355 
J\ loderate 44 .3  4 2 2  29.0 276 26.8 255 
Liberal 23.4 88 47. 1 1 77 29.5 1 1 1  
Gender ;._ j pll 4 - L 8  6"')  ;:i _ 30.9 449 24.3 353 
\YornPI I  4 0 . 6  730 30.3 485 24.2 387 
Sample 4 0 .2 1 382 30.6 934 24.2 740 
0 Table entries are the prrcent agf' ( or nu mber)  of each ro\\'-variable voting for the 
d esignated party. Percentage:-, sum to 1 00 across rows. 
bFor inflation, unemploymrn t .  and taxes , each row corresponds to voters claiming 
the economic indicator had decrea..�ed . st ayed the same, or increased in the past 
twelve months. 
cFor defense, Phil l ips C u r n .  red i s t r i b u tion . and crime, each row corresponds to 
where voters place t he msr l \'<'� 011  t h e  issue. 
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Table 2: 
Multinomial Probit Estimates, 1987 Election: {Alliance Coefficient Normalized to Zero) 
Independent Variables Conservatives Labour 
Defense - .14* 
.01 
Unemployment /Inflation -.09* 
.02 
Taxation -. 13* 
.02 
Nationalization - .14* 
.01 
Redistribution - .07* 
.01 
Crime - .08* 
.03 
Welfare - . 1 1 *  
.01 
Constant .35 1 .82* 
.51 .45 
South - .09 - .29* 
.07 .09 
Midlands - .23* - .11  
.08 .09 
North - . 12  .43* 
. 1 0  . 1 1  
Wales - .48* .94* 
.24 .18 
Scotland -.41 * .47* 
. 13  . 14 
Inflation .23* - .01 
.07 .06 
Unemployment . 23* .00 
.04 .04 
Taxes .02 - .07 
.04 .04 
Blue Collar .02 .46* 
.09 .08 
Union Member - .44 * .26* 
.07 .07 
P u blic Sector EmployeP .08 .01 
.06 . 08 
Home Ownersh i p  .36* - .37* 
.OS .08 
Age .03 - . 16* 
.OJ  . 03 
Female .2 1  * - .04 
.07 .07 
Family Income . 06* - .05* 
.02 .02 
Education - . 62* - .45* 
.21 .20 
acA .02 
.06 
CJLA .34* 
.08 
acL 29 - .39* 
.07 
I'< umber of Observations 2131 
Log Likelihood 1476.5 
Table 3 
Effects of Economics and Issues in the 1987 Election 
Conservatives Labour Alliance 
Baseline . 34 .40 .26 
Inflation Better .52 .30 . 18  
Worse .28 .43 .29 
Difference . 24 - . 13 - . 11  
Unemployment Better .52 .31 . 17  
Worse . 28 .43 . 29 
Difference .24 - . 12  - . 12  
Taxation Better .36 .35 . 28 
·worse .31 .45 .24 
Difference . 06 - . 10  . 04 
Redistribution More Equal . 28 .47 .25 
Less Equal .42 .34 . 24 
Difference - . 14  . 13 - .01  
Welfare ?\I  ore .25 .50 . 25 
Less . 45  .31 .24 
Difference - . 20 . 19  . 01  
Crime Ci\' i l -Rights .30 .44  .26 
La\\' l: Order .36 .39 .25 
Difference - . 06 .05 .01 
Defense >: o ?\ u kes .23 .54 .23 
� lore :\" u kes . 44 . 30 .25 
Difference - . 2 1  . 24 - . 02 
I\'ote: Probabi l i t i r� an· e\·a l i 1 a t ( •d for a respondent \Vith typical values 
for other Variables . S(' ( '  t l w  t < ' X t  for a prec ise explanation . 
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Table 4 
Mean Position of Respondents on Issues 
and Mean Placement of Parties by Respondents 
Conservative Labour Alliance Respondents 
Defense 8 .0 2 .1  4 .9 5 .2 
Phillips Curve 6 .4 2 .3 3 .8 3 .5  
Taxation 7 .2 3 .0 4 .4 4 .4 
Nationalization 9 . 2  2.9 5 .6 6 .4 
Redistri bu ti on 8.4 2 .9 4.8 5 .0  
Crime 7 .5 5.6 6.3 7.7 
Welfare 7 .9 2.6 4.3 4 .5 
Table entries for columns one through three are the mean placement 
of the parties on the 1 1  point-scale by all respondents giving a valid 
response. Column four is the mean self-placement of the respondents 
themselves . 
3 1  
Table 5a: Issue Simulations for Labour Support 
Vote-Shares at 
Labour Labour Labour Labour-Max* 
Issues Min Actual Max* Cons Lab All 
Defense 1 1 .0 2 . 1  5 . 0  44.0 31 .9  24 .1  
Phillips 1 1 .0 2 .3 1 .0 44.9 30. 1  25 .1  
Taxation 1 1 .0 3 .0 4 .0 44.9 29.8 25.3 
Nationalization 1 1 . 0  2 .9 6.0 43.9 32.4 23.7 
Redistribution 1 1 . 0  2 .9 3 .0 44.9 29.8 25.2 
Crime 1 . 0  5 .6 8 .0  44.6 30.4 24.5 
Welfare 1 1 .0 2 .6  3 .0 44.9 29 .9 25.2 
Labour-Max* 
on All Issuesa 41 . 9  36.2 21 .9  
Labour-Max* i s  the  position Labour would have to  be perceived at on 
each issue to get the maximum vote-share. 
a The final row gives the estimated vote-shares if Labour were perceived 
to be at Labour-Max* for all of the seven issues. 
Table 5b: Issue Simulations for Labour Support 
Two-Party Race (Alliance Removed) 
Vote-Shares at 
L<.."'.Jour Labour Labour Labour-Max; 
Issues : d in Actual Max2 Cons Lab 
Defense 1 1 . 0 2 . 1  6 .0  55.0 45 .0 
Ph illips 1 1 . 0  2 . 3  2 . 0  57 .4 42 .6 
Taxation 1 1 . 0  3 . 0  4 . 0  57 .2 42 .8 
N ationalizat i on 1 . 0 2 . 9  6 . 0  54 .6 45 .4 
Redistri bu ti on 1 1 . 0 2 .9  4 . 0  57 .3 42 .7  
Crime 1 .  () 5 . G  8 .0  56.8 43 .2 
\Velfare 1 1 . 0 2 . G  3 .0  57.3 42 .7  
Labour-l\fax; 
on All Issues 50 .2 49 .8 
Labour-Ma..x; is the posi t ion Labour would have to be perceived at on 
each issue to get the maxi mum \'Ote-share in a two-party race. 
a The final row gi ves thr  est im ated \'Ole-shares if Labour were perceived 
to be at Labour- : d ax �  for al l  of t h e  seven issues . 
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Table 6a: Issue Simulations for Conservative Support 
Vote-Shares at 
Cons Cons Cons Cons-Max"' 
Issues Min Actual Max"' Cons Lab All 
Defense 1 1 . 0  8 .0 6.0 48.0 29.0 23.0 
Phillips 1 1 .0 6 .4 3 .0 47.0 28.9 24.1 
Taxation 1 1 .0 7.2 5 .0  47.4 29.0 23.6 
Nationalization 1 .0 9 .2 6 .0 46 .1  29 .4 24.6 
Redistri bu ti on 1 1 .0 8.4 6 .0 46. 1  29.4 24.6 
Crime 1 .0 7.5 8.0 45.0 29.8 25.2 
Welfare 1 1 .0 7.9 4 .0 47.5 28.8 23.8 
Cons-Max* 
on All Issuesa 6 1 .4 22.6 16 .0 
Cons-Max* is the position the Conservative party would have to be 
perceived at on each issue to get the maximum vote-share. 
a The final row gives the estimated vote-shares if the Conservative party 
were perceived to be at Cons-Max* for all of the seven issues. 
Table 6b: Issue S imulations for Conservative Support 
Two-Party Vote (Alliance Removed) 
Vote-Shares at 
Cons Cons Cons Cons-Max2 
Issues \ I  in Actual Max; Cons Lab 
Defense 1 1 . 0 8 . 0  6 .0 59 .7 40.3 
Phillips 1 1 . 0 6 .4 2 . 0 59 .6 40 .4 
Taxation 1 1 . 0 7 . 2  4 .0  59 .7 40 .3 
N ationaliza ti on 1 . 0 9 . 2  6 .0  60:1 39.9 
Redistri bu.t i o n  1 1 . 0 8 . 4  4 ;0  58 .8  4 1 .2 
Crime 1 . 0 7 . 5  8 . 0  57 .5  42 .5 
\Velfare 1 1  . () 7 .9  3 .0  60. 1 40 .0 
Cons-Iv! ax; 
on All Issurs 73. 1  26.9 
Cons-J\lax; is thr posi t i o n t b l' Con servat ive party would have to be 
perceived at on each 1ssuf'  t u  get t he maximum vote-share in a two­
party race. 
a The final ro\Y giws t h e  es t im a t ed vote-shares if the Conservative party 
were perceived to lw at Con�- .\ l ax;  for all of the seven issues. 
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Table 7: Issue Simulations for Alliance Support 
Vote-Shares at 
All All All All-Max* 
Issues Min Actual Max* Cons Lab All 
Defense 1 1 .0 4 .9 6 .0 44.3 30.1 25.6 
Phillips 1 1 .0 3.8 2.0 45.0 29.0 26.0 
Taxation 1 1 .0 4 .4 4 .0  45 .0 29.6 25 .4 
Nationalization 1 .0 5.6 6.0 44.5 29.8 25 .7 
Redistribution 1 1 .0 4 .8 4 .0 45. 1  29.6 25.3 
Crime 1 . 0  6 .3 8.0 44.3 29 .7 26.0 
Welfare 1 1 . 0  4 .3 3 .0 45.0 29 .2 25.8 
All-Max* 
on All Issuesa 44.2 28.1 27.7 
All-Max; is the position the Alliance would have to be perceived at on 
each issue to get the maximum vote-share. 
a The final row gives the estimated vote-shares if the Alliance were 
perceived to be at All-Max; for all of the seven issues. 
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Table 8:  Respondents' Views of the Economy and Taxes 
1987 1992 
Prices: Increased a Lot 48.7 (1850) 67.7 ( 1091) 
Increased a Little 43.6 (1655) 28.9 (456) 
Stayed the Same 5 .2  (198) 2 .0 (39) 
Fallen a Little 2 .2  (85) 1 . 2  (9) 
Fallen a Lot 0.3 (10) 0 .2  (5) 
Unemployment : Increased a Lot 52 .0 ( 1941 )  76.0 ( 1 189) 
. Increased a Little 21 .8  (813) 16 .6 (286) 
Stayed the Sarne 9.0 (336) 3.5 (74) 
Fallen a Little 15 .5  (579) 2 .7 (27) 
Fallen a Lot 1 .7  (65) 1 . 2  ( 10) 
Taxes: Increased a Lot 10 .8 (373) 23 .6 (256) 
Increased a Little 25.8 (888) 34.4 (489) 
Stayed the Same 19.7 (679) 17.8 (329) 
Fallen a Little 40.6 (1398) 21 .7  (410) 
Fallen a Lot 3 .0  ( 104) 2 .5  (34) 
Table entries are the percentage and number of respondents holding 
the indicated vie\\' of prices . unemployment , and taxes in each year. 
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Table 9: Economic Simulation: Estimated Vote Outcomes 
1987 
1 992 Inflation 
1 992 Unemployment 
1992 Tax 
1992 Inflation/Unemployment 
1 992 Inflation, Unemployment, and Taxes 
Cons 
44.9 
43.9 
42.6 
44.6 
41 .6  
4 1 .2 
Labour 
29.8 
30.0 
30.4 
30.5 
30.7 
31 .4 
Alliance 
25.3 
26.0 
27.0 
24.9 
27.7 
27.4 
Note: Entries are predicted vote shares after setting the distribution 
of respondent opinions of the economy to match 1992 views of the 
economy. Based on 2 13 1  respondents. 
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